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tian has a right to make whatever commitment he pleases; and (3)
therefore, no one has a right to criticize him for this."
Both of these strike me as much clearer examples of permissive parity arguments
than the ones Penelhum discusses.
Each version ofthe parity argument turns on a crucial premise about justification
and the rationality of belief. For example, the conformist argument uses the
pyrrhonist premise that where we lack adequate evidence, we must suspend
judgment, or, in matters unavoidable, believe moderately, and follow the conventions of our fathers. This principle, and those used in other two versions (which
are harder to identify) need further elucidation and evaluation. I would like to
have seen Penelhum tum his analytical skills to this task.
Finally, Penelhum's acceptance of the permissive parity argument is a major
concession to the fideism which I take it he rejects. If his characterization of
fideism as the view that faith needs no support from reason is his considered
view, and if he accepts this argument with its conclusion that it is rationally
permissible to hold religious beliefs without basing them on evidence, then it
would seem that Penelhum is condoning a fideist position, contrary to his intentions.

From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species,
and Evolution, by Etienne Gilson. Trans. John Lyon, Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Pp. 209. $22.95.

PHILLIP R. SLOAN, University of Notre Dame.
The questions dealt with by the book-natural teleology, evolutionary biology,
and metaphysics-are crucial issues in any philosophical reflection on biology,
particular those undertaken in a religious context, and I was interested to see
the contribution of Gilson's deep historical and philosophical insights to these
questions. Initially I should note that the history and philosophy of the life
sciences is no stranger to Gilson, although it has been many years since he last
dealt with such problems. Among his many titles is his Descartes, Harvey et la
Scolastique,l a work still worth careful study by Harvey and Descartes scholars.
His reading of the primary sources of Buffon, Bonnet, Linnaeus, Lamarck,
Cuvier, Darwin, and Spencer is interesting if for no other reason than that it
turns Gilson's erudition onto this group of the founders of modem biology. His
discussion of more recent biological theory and theorists-Walter Elsasser, Jacques Monad, and Georges Canguilhem-does not avoid all the pitfalls awaiting
the non-specialist in these areas, but it shows a refreshing intellectual toughness
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and clarity which have always been Gilson's identifying characteristics.
The main issues addressed by this set of essays center around an examination
of natural teleology, and the viability of this concept in the face of the challenges
posed by modem biology. Teleological purposiveness, and particularly the claims
of a non-relative finalism of organic life, is not a popular concept in modem
biology. The standard view among many theorists of biology would seem more
to he that the development of modem biology has effectively destroyed the
concept, not only in its Platonic-Stoic physicotheological interpretation, which
affirms an external rationality or "N ature" designing organisms to pre-determined
ends, but also in its immanent Aristotelian form. 2
Gilson's undertaking is to examine the relation of teleology and biology in
light of what he interprets to be the mechanistic challenge. The larger importance
of this issue is transparent. The degree to which one can make some kind of
appeal to an inherent natural teleology as grounding for a natural-law ethic, or
to the organic world as showing some evidence of divine creation, would seem
to depend at some point on the viability of some kind of teleological interpretation
of life. As a Neo-Thomist, Gilson is predictably a realist about natural teleology.
The deeper question is whether such a position can really be sustained in the
wake of modem advances in the understanding of biology.
Gilson deals with this issue in a series of loosely connected essays. Opening
with a discussion of Aristotle's notion of biological teleology, Gilson has followed
this onto a discussion of the classic confrontation between "mechanistic" and
"teIcogical" perspectives in the discussions of the Greek nature philosophers.
This is succeeded by a chapter on Darwinian evolution and finality. Discussions
of Bergson's views on teleology and an analysis of the modem confrontation
between mechanistic reductionism and finalism close the book. Somewhat curiously placed, two appendices are given, one simply reproducing Linnaeus' first
edition of the Systema naturae of 1735, and the second a discussion of Darwin's
concept of organic species. I felt the latter belonged in the text proper.
As a general comment on the work, it cannot be considered to be an exhaustive
analysis of any of the topics with which it deals. Certain problems of organization
also render its treatment of the issues episodic rather than a smoothly integrated
study. This is regrettable, because I found the book wandering too much from
the central issues, and in the end I was wishing for more substance. Nevertheless,
I found it useful for raising several central problems in a way that is rarely
available in English literature.
The opening discussion of Aristotle's notion of organic teleology was brief,
but pithy, and it served to clarify some important points concerning Aristotle's
position on these questions. Gilson emphasizes that Aristotle's conception of
natural teleology is neither properly assimilated under "vitalism," which Gilson
views as a Platonic notion, nor is it deeply committed to the causal efficacy of
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metaphysical entities, such as soul, which historically have formed components
of Aristotle's biology. Gilson also clarifies, I feel, some of the complexities in
Aristotle's positions. It is not clear that Aristotle himself was committed to a
general teleology of "Nature" as distinct from the individualized finalism of
specific instantiated "natures," at least if by "Nature" is meant some kind of
Platonic Demiurge or World-soul. 3 This is an important point, and it was one
that could have sustained an extended discussion, since much of the confusion
surrounding teleology and biology depend on the substitution of Platonic-Stoic
meanings for those properly seen as Aristotelian. Gilson also clarifies, I feel,
the point that Aristotle's final cause is not dependent on the notion that the future
acts as a causal agency on the present to bring about its own realization-that
is, a cause to be conceived as acting in the same way as material and efficient
causes. It is more an empirically-given aspect of nature, a spontaneous activity,
which is recognized in all our natural intuitions of the organization and subordination of heterogeneous parts to one another in organic beings (p. 7). Aristotelian
teleology does not, on his analysis, involve a "conscious" intentionality on the
part of organisms other than man, and it is not based on a naive anthropomorphism
attributing to "Nature" the conscious artistry of human design. Nature for this
reason does not imitate art. Rather, art is a conscious and learned analogue of
the processes accomplished naturally in organisms without foresight and planning.
The fertilized ovum becomes the adult chicken spontaneously, but directionally,
through a series of identifiable stages which man, through his reflection, can
imitate by positing rational ends for realization in the future (p. 11).
This does seem, if I read Gilson correctly, to imply that the Aristotelian is
not committed to the view that one can simply read off, in an unproblematic
way, the teleological purposes of natural things. The purposiveness of nature is
grasped by analogy, and the intuitive experience of teleology is not necessarily
even fully articulatable:
The analogy with art, then, assists us to recognize the presence in nature
of a cause analogous to that which is intelligence in the operations of
man, but we do not know what this cause is. The notion of a teleology
without consciousness and immanent in nature remains mysterious to
us. Aristotle does not think that this should be a reason to deny its
existence. Mysterious or not, the fact is there. It is not incomprehensible
because of its complexity, which we can only hope science will one
day clarify, but because of its very nature, which does not allow it to
be expressed in a formula. (p. 10)
Locating the issue of teleology at the level of an empirical intuition rather
than at that of a causal explanation is clarifying, and it serves to eliminate many
of the standard objections to the validity of the concept. The classic "mechanistic"
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objection has centered on the issue of the fruitlessness of teleogical explanations,
and the history of the biomedical sciences since Harvey would seem to support
the claim that the elimination of Greek teleological accounts of organic process
was critical for the growth of modem biology. But the claim that teleological
purposiveness forms an overarching, immediate intuition of the organic realm
which cannot be eliminated by any analytic dissection of organisms into their
component physico-chemical mechanisms, locates the issue at a different point.
Gilson in fact seems to prefer the sharp separation of scientific from metaphysical
is:mes here, acknowledging that science has little to say, for or against, the
concept of teleology as he interprets the question. The issue lies at the level of
the underlying foundations of natural philosophy (pp. 16,31).
This is all eminently sensible, I feel, but one is left with a difficulty. Simply
removing the issue from the domain of science does not itself warrant the interpretations Gilson gives of the problem. Several philosophers have acknowledged
Gilson's point about the necessity of a teleological perspective on organisms
without accepting his conclusions, and Fr. Jaki seems correct in his preface in
seeing the issue to be that of scientific Realism, which is ultimately to be grounded
on the theological doctrine of creation. Without this as premise in the argument,
it is difficult to see that the recognition of natural purposiveness implies the truth
of a general teleological perspective. I couldn't help but feel that the author
Gilson really needed to do more with in this discussion was not Bergson, but
Kant and his detailed discussions of exactly these issues in the Critique of
Judgment. Kant also endorses many of the points Gilson has recognized, and
similarly denies the adequacy of a fully mechanistic biology, but with one
important difference-the teleological judgement, while in fact necessary for the
study of biology, is nevertheless not constitutive of it, and it leaves one with
the notion of a regulative principle which is gradually eliminable by the success
of mechanistic science. The importance of Kant's interpretation of the problem
for the success of modem biology has only begun to be explored. 41t raises issues
that those defending Gilson's teleological realism, and I would consider myself
one of these, need to deal with more directly.
Too little account is taken of a second set of issues. Granting a realist interpretation of teleological purposiveness, one still must distinguish the admission of
immediate purposiveness of organic function and structure from the conclusion
of a non-relative finalism of life in general. This is the point at issue in the
preference among many biological theorists for the concept of "teleonomy,"
which is an attempt to recognize both the purposive character of organisms,
without a commitment to a more general teleology of nature. S Rather than seeing
this simply as linguistic trickery, as Stanley Jaki interprets it, there is a substantial
issue here. One can surely acknowledge the functional subordination of parts,
the close relation of form and function to conditions of life, and even the fact
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that organisms clearly carry out goal-seeking activities, without implying a larger
teleology of life sufficient for theological and ethical concerns. 6 This is, as I
understand it, the real issue facing Gilson and those endorsing his position.
Gilson's approach to the question of teleology is, in my view, a generally good
one. It must remain for others to deepen these arguments sufficiently.
I was particularly interested to see the application Gilson made of these arguments in his treatment of evolutionary biology. The title of the book will undoubtably draw a readership from those hoping to find a Thomistic-Aristotelian solution
to the issues raised by evolutionary biology, and those aware of the evolutionary
literature are familiar with the fact that it is the anti-teleological implications of
natural selection which are repeatedly summoned to deny theistic interpretations
of evolution. Here I was somewhat disappointed, not so much by what Gilson
concluded, but by the approach he took. For a small book, too much space was
devoted to belabouring a well-known issue-the fact that Darwin never explicitly,
except on one occasion, used the term 'evolution' to characterize his theory.
Gilson's larger point is more interesting, and is one I would have liked to see
him develop more fully-namely that there is a distinction to be made between
the scientific theory formulated by Darwin to explain the variety of geological,
paleontological, anatomical and biogeographical facts at his disposal, and
evolutionary natural philosophies, particularly as formulated by Herbert Spencer
and Henri Bergson. The latter theories comprise, on Gilson's view, modem
"evolutionism," and Darwin's position vis-a-vis these claims is viewed as ambiguous. Gilson is correct, I feel, in seeing Darwin's interests as primarily those of
a natural scientist, rather than being those of a natural philosopher, at least to
the extent that he typically subsumed metaphysical and theological questions to
those more properly scientific and empirical. Gilson was also refreshingly candid
in admitting that the empirical issues being discussed by Darwin are often technical and not easily accessible to the lay reader.
While I found Gilson's discussions of Darwinism and evolutionary theory
judicious and fair, I could not agree with his assessment on several points.
Gilson's awareness of the Darwinian archive, beyond the published Origin and
Descent of Man, is slight, and there is insufficient grasp of the complex issues
which formed the context in which Darwin's theory emerged. He also relies too
heavily on the claims of certain authors (Paul Lemoine) to represent an alleged
scientific consensus on the deficiencies of evolutionary theory. 7 The numerous
reassessments of Darwin and evolutionary biology made in 1982 centennial
commemorations, while surely not revealing a seamless cloth of scholarly opinion, would hardly support such a view. 8
Gilson's analysis of the issues posed by evolutionary biology are not detailed,
and to the degree that they can be characterized, his points would generally fall
in the category of what I would term "Cuvierian" arguments, meaning that they
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repeat in general substance the arguments made by the French naturalist Georges
Cuvier (1769-1832) against early versions of transformism. This is not surprising,
since Cuvier also was deeply influenced by the analysis of form, function and
teleological purposiveness developed by Aristotle, particularly in such works as
the De Partibus animalium, and from these foundations Cuvier drew what for
a time were seen as devastating critiques of the possibility of genuine trans formism. 9
Space will not permit a full analysis of the Cuvierian critique, and the responses
to it. It is one which appears in sophisticated versions of "creation science," and
it raises points that do need to be taken more fully into account by theorists of
biology. However, it typically succeeds as a critique of Darwinian evolution
only by a failure to take into sufficient account Darwin's actual arguments.
It is important to see more generally what is at issue in this critique. First
there is the claim that because organisms are organized and harmonious wholes,
rather than Empedoclean assemblages of dissociated parts, evolution becomes
implausible because it seems to imply an accidental assemblage of parts in which
the survival of the resultant forms becomes unimaginable. Gilson thus objects
that "observable plants and animals can only subsist thanks to the accord of the
part:, of which they are composed." (p. 83). Those aware of the historical context
in which evolutionary theory appeared in its Darwinian version, recognize that
the standard objections against it entrenched in the reigning scientific opinion
were all broadly Cuvierian, and Darwin realized that his theory needed to meet
these kinds of objections to convince his critical audience of scientific peers.
The working of Darwinian theory by evolutionary gradualism, slight variation,
great expanses of time, and its use of precisely the same intimate coordinate
relationships of form and function affirmed by Cuvier, were decisive factors in
disaIming scientific objections on these grounds to his theory. I will not seek to
examine the problems which might be raised with these premises of Darwinian
evolution here. It is important to be aware that Gilson raises no new lines of
objection, nor are his objections ones which were not considered by Darwin
himself in some detail. Once this is recognized, it is less easy to see these kinds
of critiques as really decisive. Darwin was, it must be remembered, eventually
able to convince even the most sceptical and knowledgeable members of the
scientific community of his day, naturalists such as Lyell and Owen, of the
plam.ibility of his theoretical account, at least in its main features.
Gilson's second broad line of objection is also "Cuvierian" in that he bases
it, as Cuvier had, on a strongly "positivist" interpretation of science, meaning
by this that science is conceived to be an inquiry concerned with necessary
demonstration from strictly empirical premises (pp. 89, 93, 109, 149). Such
criticisms need to be questioned. Gilson's conception of science in fact seems
to exclude all hypotheses and theoretical leaps, all appeals to unobservable
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entities, from scientific reasoning. 10 Of course, when science is interpreted in
this way, evolutionary biology is indeed not "science." But this view of science
reduces it at some point to a hypothesis-free summary of data and an exercise
in deductive logic, and at least to this extent evolutionary theory is in nor more
difficulty than all of modern science, since nothing since Descartes' failed attempt
to construct a totally demonstrative physics from true and certain premises seems
to be able to satisfy Gilson's criteria. It is one thing to claim that Darwinian
theory violates the empirical data, something which is yet to be shown conclusively, and another to claim that it goes beyond the given data by positing
connections and relationships among the empirical data which are admittedly
hypothetical and dependent on hypothesis and speculative leaps. It has been all
too easy for critics of evolutionary biology to move from awareness of the latter
to assertions of the former, and Gilson does not escape this fallacy.
On the whole, I was also disappointed with the degree to which Gilson dealt
with the question of evolution and natural teleology in this book. He points out
important issues that surely need to be reflected upon-for example that Darwin
implied some belief in an inherent teleological purposiveness to "Nature" in
many statements of the Origin. Gilson also sees that this could not be merely
metaphor and accidental locution, since the validity of Darwin's appeal at many
points to the analogy between artificial and natural selection depends on the
force of this intentional analogy. However, Gilson is unaware of the complex
layerings of the development of Darwin's argument from the Notebooks onward,
in which Darwin moved increasingly toward a non-teleological interpretation of
natural selection. II This represents more than confusion on Darwin's part, because
the admission of a relative finality of organisms, and a close subordination of
form, function and activity to external conditions of life can be rendered intelligible without necessarily implying a larger purposiveness to organic life. Admittedly this development creates problems for Darwin's use of the artificial-natural
selection analogy. But Darwin's move toward the "survival of the fittest" interpretation of natural selection leaves open the possibility of a purely relative finalism
of life. Dinosaurs can be judged as "adapted" to a given set of environmental
conditions, meaning by this that they can be asserted to have de Jacto possessed
the necessary structures and functions for life under those conditions, and
nevertheless became extinct as those conditions apparently altered.
It is surely as possible to interpret this in the non-teleological sense of Hume's
"prolific Mother creating beings to no end" as it is to see in it a larger teleological
purposiveness. Darwin's mature views increasingly tended to Hume' s position,
and critiques of natural teleology by evolutionary biologists do likewise. This
is surely not to say that such arguments are unanswerable. I do not feel they
bear in the way often asserted on the question of divine creation. But it does
mean that sufficient treatment of these questions needs to consider a broader set
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of issues and texts than is done in this book. The greatest danger would be to
consider Gilson's discussions as more than question-posing reflections, a prolegomena to a deeper discussion that hopefully someone will choose to undertake.
As a final comment, I found the text well-prepared, the translation clear in
most parts, and the notes useful. John Lyon has done an admirable job of locating
English editions and page references for Gilson's citations, and has pointed out
some nagging errors in citations of sources in Gilson's text.

NOTES

1. Publications de la Faculte des Lettres de l' Universite de Strasbourg (1921), reprinted in Gilson,
Etudes sur Ie role de la pensee mtidievale dans laformation du systeme cartesien (Paris: Vrin, 1930),
pp.51-101.

2. A good statement of this is in Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 516.
3. See W. Wieland, "The Problem of Teleology," in 1. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds.)
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6. See Francisco Ayala, "Teleological Explanation in Evolutionary Biology," Philosophy of Science
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7. Paul Lemoine, "Conclusions generales," Encyclopedie francaise t. V (Paris, 1965).
8. Three main conferences in the 1981-82 period should be consulted. The proceedings of the
international Cambridge centennial conference, drawing together primarily biologists, is published
as D.S. Bendall (ed.) Evolution From Molecules to Men (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983); The Berlin conference, with several papers from a morphological perspective, is published
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1916; reprinted Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
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